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Graham: Partnership Special Alloctions: The Effect of Proposed Regulation

PARTNERSHIP SPECIAL ALLOCATIONS:
THE EFFECT OF PROPOSED REGULATION SECTION 1.704-1(b)
INTRODUarION

Partnership special allocations are provisions in a partnership agreement
which provide for the allocation of partnership profits and losses (or items
thereof) in a manner inconsistent with the partners' interests in the partnership.' If these special allocations possess "substantial economic effect," they
will be recognized for tax purposes. 2 The current Treasury Regulations, however, do not adequately explain or illustrate the application of the substantial
economic effect test.3 In response to this indefiniteness, the Department of the
Treasury published Proposed Regulation section 1.704-1(b).4 The Proposed
Regulations specifically detail when a special allocation of income, loss, gain,
deduction or credit in a partnership agreement will pass the substantial economic effect test under section 704(b)(2). 5
This article will examine the rules promulgated by the Proposed Regulations and compare them with judicial and legislative interpretations of the
substantial economic effect test. In addition, this article will study the regulations' potential effect on special allocations of real estate limited partnerships.
In conclusion, this article will suggest modifications to the Proposed Regulations before their final issuance by the Department of the Treasury.
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF SECTION

704(b)(2)

Section 704 of the 1954 Internal Revenue Code, as originally enacted, permitted the special allocation of any item of income, loss, gain, deduction or
credit if the principal purpose of the allocation was not the avoidance or
evasion of taxes. If a special allocation provision was disallowed under prior
law, then the item was reallocated among the partners pursuant to the ratios
that governed the division of bottom-line income or losses of the partnership.6
Because of the prior law's method of reallocating invalidated special allocations, it was uncertain whether bottom-line allocations were subject to the
7
"principle purpose" limitation.
1. The Staff of the Joint Committee on Taxation has offered the following definition for
the term "special allocations:" "A limited (or a general) partnership agreement may allocate

income, gain, loss, deduction or credit (or items thereof) among the partners in a manner
that is disproportionate to the capital contributions of the partners. These are sometimes
referred to as 'special allocations'...." Staff of the Joint Committee on Taxation, General
Explanation of the Tax Reform Act of 1976, at 94 (1976), reprintedin 1976-3 C.B. 106.
2.

I.R.C. § 704(a), (b)(2) (1976).

3. Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(b) (1956). This Regulation was enacted prior to the adoption of
"substantial economic effect" as the statutory standard for special allocations.
4. 48 Fed. Reg. 9871 (1983).
5. Id.

6. I.R.C. § 704(b)(2) (1954) (prior to the enactment of the Tax Reform Act of 1976).
7. See Holladay v. Commissioner, 72 T.C. 571 (1979), aff'd, 649 F.2d 1176 (5th Cir. 1981);
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The present Treasury regulations identify a number of factors which were
to be considered in determining whether tax avoidance was the "principal
purpose" behind a special allocation provision8 Although the Treasury regulations imply that the factors should be weighed equally, courts and commentators considered "substantial economic effect" as the critical test in
evaluating special allocation provisions under the prior law. 9 If the special
allocation provision had substantial economic effect, courts generally sustained
the allocation unless it was clearly motivated by tax avoidance purposes.' 0
The Tax Reform Act of 197611 produced significant changes in section
704(b). The standard for determining the validity of special allocations was
redrafted to require that the special allocations possess "substantial economic
effect."' 1 The reallocation formula for disallowed special allocations was
3
changed to "in accordance with the partner's interest in the partnership.'
The 1976 Act also provides that special allocations of bottom-line income or
losses of the partnership will now be subject to the scrutiny of section 704
(b)(2).14 Despite this change in the statutory test, the prior interpretation of
substantial economic effect under the old principal purpose limitation continues to possess legal vitality.' 5 Therefore, the substantial economic effect
Boynton v. Commissioner, 72 T.C. 1147 (1979), aff'd, 649 F.2d 1168 (5th Cir. 1981), cert.
denied, 102 S. Ct. 1009 (1982); Kresser v. Commissioner, 54 T.C. 1621, 1631 n.5 (1970).
8. Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(b)(2) (1956).
(a) Whether the partnership or a partner individually has a business purpose for the
allocation;
(b) [W]hether the allocation has "substantial economic effect", that is, whether the
allocation may actually affect the dollar amount of the partners' shares of the total
partnership income or loss independently of tax consequences;
(c) [W]hether related items of income, gain, loss, deduction, or credit from the same
source are subject to the same allocation;
(d) [W]hether the allocation was made without recognition of normal business factors
and only after the amount of the specially allocated item could reasonabi[y] be estimated;
(e) [T]he duration of the allocation; and
(f) [T]he overall tax consequences of the allocation.
9. See Hamilton v. United States, 687 F.2d 408, 414 (Ct. Cl. 1982); Harris v. Commissioner, 61 T.C. 770, 786 (1974); Orrisch v. Commissioner, 55 T.C. 395, 402-04 (1970), aff'd
per curiam, 31 A.F.T.R.2d 1069 (9th Cir. 1973); Magaziner v. Commissioner, 37 T.C.M. 873,

875 (1978). See also W. McKEE, W.

NELSON

& R.

WHITMIRE, FEDERAL TAXATION OF PARTNER-

10.01(2) (1977); A. WILLIS, J. PENNELL & P. POSTLEWAITE, PARTNERSHIP
TAXATION, § 82.03 (3d ed. 1981); Weidner, Partnership Allocations and Capital Accounts
Analysis, 42 OHIO ST. L.J. 467, 469 (1981).
10. See Allison v. United States, 701 F.2d 933 (D.C. Cir. 1983). For a discussion of
Allison, see Gotliboski & Graham, Allocation Issues: Allison -A Different Result Under Proposed Allocation Regulations, I J. PARTNERSHIP TAX'N 76 (1984).
I1. Pub. L. No. 94-455, 90 Stat. 1520 (1976) [hereinafter the 1976 Act].
12. I.R.C. § 704(b)(2) (1976).
13. Id. § 704(b).
14. See H.R. REP. No 658, 94th Cong., Ist Sess. 126 (1976), reprinted in 1976-3 C.B. 818;
S. REP. No. 938, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 98-100 (1976), reprinted in 1976-3 C.B. 136-38.
15. The Senate Finance Committee Report specifically states: "[T]he Committee believes
that allocations of special items and overall allocations should be restricted to those situations
SHIPS AND PARTNERS §
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standard prescribed by the current Treasury regulations and case law should
be the basic foundation for Proposed Regulation section 1.704-1(b). At this
point, an inquiry into the interpretation of the substantial economic effect
concept by the courts and current Treasury regulations is essential.
SUBSTANTIAL ECONOMIC EFFECT

BF

EoTHE PROPOSED REGULATIONS

The Treasury Regulations state that a special allocation has "substantial
economic effect"' 6 where it "may actually affect the dollar amount of the
partners' shares of the total partnership income or loss independently of tax
consequences."' 7 The Treasury's interpretation of substantial economic effect
was first applied in Orrisch v. Commissioner.18 In Orrisch, the original partnership agreement provided the partners an equal share of the profits and losses
from the operation of two rental houses as well as any proceeds from a sale of
the properties. The partners later amended the partnership agreement to
specially allocate to the Orrisch partner group all the depreciation deductions
allowable on the rental properties.19 The amendment further stipulated that
any subsequent recognized gain resulting from the specially allocated depreciation deductions would be allocated to the Orrisch partner group.
In determining whether the allocation had "substantial economic effect,"
the Tax Court focused on the effect of the special allocation on the partners'
capital accounts. 20 The court noted the partnership agreement expressly provided that any gain resulting from the specially allocated depredation deductions would be charged back to the Orrisch partner group. The agreement,
however, failed to address the distribution of the economic burden of the
depredation deductions if the rental houses were sold for less than their
original cost. Because the partnership agreement was silent on this point, the

where the allocations have substantial economic effect, as presently interpreted by the regulations and case law." (emphasis added). S. REP. No. 938, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 99-100 (1976),
reprinted in 1976-3 C.B. 136-38. A more thorough discussion of the legislative history and
case law concerning special allocations, prior to the amendment of section 704(b) by the Tax
Reform Act of 1976, can be found in Kamin, Partnership Income and Loss Allocations
Before And After The Tax Reform Act of 1976, 30 TAx LA w. 667 (1977).
16. The "substantial economic effect" concept originated in the Senate Finance Committee Report accompanying the Internal Revenue Code's 1954 version of § 704(b)(2). The
Report stated in part:
Where, however, a provision in a partnership agreement for a special allocation of
certain items has substantial economic effect and is not merely a device for reducing
the taxes of certain partners without actually affecting their shares of partnership income, then such a provision will be recognized for tax purposes. (emphasis added).
S. REP,. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 379 (1954), reprinted in 1954 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEws 4621, 5021.
17. Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(b)(2) (1956).
18. 55 T.C. 395 (1970), aff'd per curiam, 31 A.F.T.R.2d 1069 (9th Cir. 1973).
19. Orrisch involved two couples. One couple was the Orrisches (hereinafter referred to
as the Orrisch partner group) and the other was the Crisafis.
20. Id. at 403 (1970).
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court assumed the partners intended to share the sale proceeds equally if the
properties were sold at a loss.!1
The court concluded the special allocation lacked substantial economic
effect since the Orrisch partner group was not required to bear the economic
burden of the depreciation deductions. As a result, the partnership agreement
had violated the principal purpose rule of section 704(b)(2). The court thus
disallowed the special allocation of the depreciation deductions to the
Orrisch partner group. 22 Under Orrisch, whether a special allocation has substantial economic effect is determined by examining the effect of the specially
23
allocated item on the partners' capital accounts.
The CapitalAccounts Analysis
Following Orrisch, most courts and commentators adopted the capital accounts analysis as the proper method for ascertaining whether a special allocation has substantial economic effect. 24 In Magaziner v. Commissioner,25 the Tax

Court set forth the elements of the capital accounts analysis. The court stated
that a special allocation has substantial economic effect if the allocation is reflected in a partner's capital account and the liquidation proceeds of the
partnership are distributed in a manner consistent with the capital accounts. 2 6

21. Id. at 404.
22. Id.
23. See Allison v. United States, 701 F.2d 933, 938-40 (D.C. Cir. 1983). See also Hamilton
v. United States, 687 F.2d 408, 419 n.29 (Ct. Cl. 1982); Harris v. Commissioner, 61 T.C. 770,
786 (1974); W. McKEE, W. NELSON S. R. WmrTMIa, supra note 8 ,§ 10.02(2); Cowan Substantial
Economic Effect - The Outer Limits for PartnershipAllocations, 39 INST. ON FED. TAX'N 23-1,
23-5, 23-6 (1981); Solomon, Current Planning for Partnership Startup, Including Special
Allocations, Retroactive Allocations and Guaranteed Payments, 37 INST. ON FED. TAX'N 13-1,
-11, -12 (1979).
24. See W. McKEE, W. NELSON & R. WHITMIRE, supra note 9, § 10.02(2); A. WILLIS,
J. PENNELL & P. POSTLEWAITE, supra note 9, § 86.03; Cates, Insuring That Special Allocations
of PartnershipIncome and Loss Are Recognized, 9 TAX'N FOR LAw. 202, 203 (1981); McKee,
PartnershipAllocations: The Need For An Entity Approach, 66 VA. L. REV. 1039, 1043 (1980);
contra Weidner, supra note 9, at 487-504. The Internal Revenue Service has specifically approved the use of the capital accounts analysis as a means of determining whether a special
allocation has "substantial economic effect" in some cases. See Ltr. Rul. 8247003 (June 1,
1981); Ltr. Rul. 8008054 (Nov. 28, 1979). The Staff of the Joint Committee on Taxation has
also advocated an analysis of the partners' capital accounts. The Staff stated:
The determination of whether an allocation may actually affect the dollar amount
of the partners' shares of the lotal partnership income or loss, independent of tax
consequences, will to a substantial extent involve an examination of how these allocations are treated in the partners' capital accounts for financial (as opposed to tax)
accounting purposes; this assumes that these accounts actually reflect the dollar
amounts that the partners would have the rights to receive upon the liquidation of
the partnership.
Staff of the Joint Committee on Taxation, General Explanation of the Tax Reform Act of
1976, at 95 n.6 (1976), reprintedin 1976-3 C.B. 107 n.6.
25. 37 T.C.M. 873 (1978).
26. Id. at 875.
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At this point, the capital accounts analysis can be more clearly illustrated
through several examples.
Assume individuals A and B form the AB partnership with each partner
contributing $75,000 cash. The partnership uses the $150,000 to purchase a
building which is held for rent. Under the partnership agreement, A and B
agree to share the profits and losses of the partnership equally, except for the
$10,000 annual depreciation deduction 2 7 which is specially allocated to B.
Assuming that the rental income equals the cash operating expenses for the
first year, the basis and capital accounts of A and B at the end of the first year
would be as follows:
A

B

Basis

Capital
Account

Basis

Capital
Account

Capital Contribution
Operating Profit or Loss
Depredation Deduction

$75,000

$75,000

$75,000

$75,000

-

-

-

-

-

Balance at End of Year 1

$75,000

$75,000

-

(10,000)

(10,000)

$65,000

$65,000

If the special allocation of the depredation deduction is to have substantial
economic effect, B must suffer the economic burden of the deduction. The
partnership agreement must therefore provide that if the building is later
sold for an amount below its original cost, the sale proceeds will be allocated
in accordance with the partners' capital accounts. 28 For example, should the
partners sell the building for $140,000 at the end of the first year 2 9 A would
receive $75,000 and B would receive $65,000.30 Because the special allocation
of the depreciation deduction may actually affect the partners shares of the sale
proceeds, the allocation has substantial economic effect under section 704
27. The partnership elects to depreciate the building over a fifteen-year period under
the straight line method, thus allowing for a $10,000 annual depreciation deduction.
28. See Magaziner v. Commissioner, 87 T.C.M. 878, 875 (1978); Orrisch v. Commissioner,
55 T.C. 895, 408-04 (1970), af'cd per curiam, 31 A.F.T.R.2d 1069 (9th Cir. 1978). If the partnership agreement in Orrisch had contained a provision requiring the partners to share the
sale proceeds of the properties in accordance with their capital accounts, the Tax Court
would have recognized the special allocation of the depreciation deductions in that case as
having substantial economic effect. Hamilton v. United States, 687 F.2d 408, 419 n.29 (Ct. Cl.

1982).
29. Assuming the depreciation deduction of $10,000 was an accurate appraisal of the
building's economic decline in value, the building would be worth $140,000 at the end of
the first year.
80. If, in this situation, the fair market value of the building had decreased to $130,000
at the end of year 1, the capital accounts analysis would allocate the sale proceeds $70,000 to
A and $60,000 to B. In other words, since the partnership's adjusted basis in the building,
$140,000, was greater than the amount realized from the sale, $130,000, the partnership would
recognize a $10,000 loss. I.R.C. § 1001(a), (c) (1976). Pursuant to the partnership agreement,
this loss would be allocated equally between A and B. Thus, the partnership loss would
reduce A's capital account balance from $75,000 to $70,000 and B's capital account balance
from $65,000 to $60,000. The sale proceeds from the building would then be allocated in
accordance with the partners' capital account balances.
31. See similar illustrations in W. McKEE, W. NELSON & R. WHrrmam, supra note 8,
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Alternatively, assume the building is still worth its original cost of $150,000.
If the building is sold at the end of the first year for its fair market value, the
partnership would recognize a $10,000 gain.3 2 Under the partnership agreement, the gain would be allocated equally to A and B. The effect of the sale
of the building on the partner's basis and capital accounts would be as follows:
B

A

Balance at End of
Year 1 - Before
Sale of Building
Partnership Gain from
Sale of Building
Balance

Basis

Capital
Account

Basis

Capital
Account

$75,000

$75,000

$65,000

$65,000

5,000

5,000

5,000

5,000

$80,000

80,000

$70,000

$70,000

A strict application of the capital accounts analysis requires that the sale
proceeds be allocated according to the above capital account balances, $80,000
to A and $70,000 to B. Under this approach, A realizes an economic gain of
$5,000, 83 while B suffers a $5,000 economic loss. 3 4 Obviously, B did not expect
the additional $5,000 tax deduction provided by the special allocation provision3 5 to actually cost him $5,000 cash.3 6
§

10.02(2); A. WILLIS, J. PENNELL & P. POSTLEWAITE, supra note 9, § 86.03; Cates, supra note
24, at 204; Krane & Sheffield, Beyond "Orrisch": An Alternative View of Substantial Economic
Effect Under Section 704(b)(2) Where Nonrecourse Debt Is Involved, 60 TAXES 937, 943 (1982);
Solomon, supra note 23, at 13-17, 13-18. In order to fully explore the overall economic and
tax consequences produced by the special allocation of the depreciation deduction to B, assume B is in the 50% tax bracket. A invested $75,000 in the partnership and received $75,000
in liquidation proceeds, thus breaking even from an economic standpoint. B invested $75,000
in the partnership and received $65,000 in liquidation proceeds, thus suffering a $10,000
economic loss from the partnership venture before considering the tax savings produced by
the specially allocated depreciation deduction. Since B is in the 50% tax bracket, the $10,000
depreciation deduction for year I produced a tax savings of $5,000. When the $5,000 of tax
savings are deducted from the $10,000 economic loss, it reduces the overall economic loss to
$5,000. Therefore, B's overall out-of-pocket loss from the partnership venture was $5,000.
32. The $10,000 gain is the excess of the amount realized from the sale, $150,000, over
the adjusted basis of the property, $140,000. See I.R.C. § 1001(a), (c) (1976).
33. Partner A would receive $80,000 of the sale proceeds, which is $5,000 greater than his
cash investment of $75,000.
34. Partner B would receive $70,000 of the sale proceeds, which is $5,000 less than his
cash investment of $75,000.
35. See supra note 31.
36. See Caruthers, Real Estate Tax Shelters: Special and Retroactive Allocations Under
the Tax Reform Act of 1976, 4 J. REAL EsT. TAX 119, 129 (1977); Cates, supra note 24, at
205. To examine the overall economic and tax consequences of the specially allocated depreciation deduction, assume A and B are both in the 50% tax bracket. Since the building
is not a capital asset under § 1221(2) nor depreciable property used in the trade or business
and held for more than one year under § 1231(b)(1), each partner's share of the partnership
gain would be taxed at ordinary income rates. The economic and tax consequences to the
partners are illustrated as follows:
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If the partnership agreement contained a gain chargeback provision, however, the sale proceeds would be divided equally in accordance with the part-

ners' capital accounts. A gain chargeback provision requires that the portion of
partnership gain which is attributable to specially allocated depredation de-

ductions be charged to the partner who benefited from the special allocation.Y
B's capital account would thus be increased by the entire $10,000 gain, result-

ing in a balance of $75,000. Since A and B would then each have a capital
account balance of $75,000, the sale proceeds from the building would be

divided equally.38
Although the special allocation of the depredation deduction in the above

example has no economic effect on the partners' shares of the sale proceeds
Share of the Sales Proceeds

A
$80,000

B
$70,000

Investment in the Partnership

(75,000)

(75,000)

Economic Gain (Loss) from the Partnership Venture

$ 5,000

($5,000)

Tax on the Partnership Gain

(2,500)

(2,500)

Tax Savings Produced by the Depreciation Deduction

-

Overall Economic Gain (Loss) after Consideration of
Tax Consequences

$ 2,500

5,000
(S 2,500)

37. A gain chargeback provision allocates gain in a manner obviously disproportionate
to the partners' interests in the partnership. Therefore, the gain chargeback provision is a
special allocation which must also meet the "substantial economic effect" prerequisite of
§ 704(b)(2). The amount of any gain allocated to a partner by a gain chargeback provision
would increase the partner's capital account balance. Because Magaziner requires that
liquidation proceeds be allocated in accordance with the partners' capital accounts, the gain
chargeback provision would actually have an effect on the partners' shares of any sale proceeds, for an amount in excess of the property's adjusted basis. Since the gain chargeback
provision "may actually affect" the partners' shares of the dollars generated by the partnership, it will pass the substantial economic effect test. Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(b) (1956).
38. To illustrate the economic and tax consequences produced by the specially allocated
depreciation deduction and the gain chargeback provision, assume B is in the 50% tax
bracket. Also assume the partnership has held the building for more than one year at the
time of the sale. A invested $75,000 in the partnership and received $75,000 in liquidation
proceeds, so he broke even from an economic standpoint. B invested $75,000 in the partnership and received $75,000 in liquidation proceeds, so he also appears to have broken even
from an economic standpoint. However, after taking the tax consequences into account, B
actually realizes an overall economic gain of $3,000, determined as follows:
Share of the Sales Proceeds

A
$75,000

B
$75,000

Investment in the Partnership

(75,000)

(75,000)

Economic Gain (Loss) from the Partnership Venture

$ 0

$ 0

Tax on Partnership Gain

-

( 2,000)0

Tax Savings from Depreciation Deduction

-

5,00000

Overall Economic Gain (Loss) after Consideration of
Tax Consequences

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1983
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from the building, 39 the special allocation should still pass the substantial
economic effect requirement of section 704(b)(2). The Treasury regulations
state that a special allocation has substantial economic effect if the allocation
"may actually affect" the partners' shares of total partnership income or loss.40

At the time the partners agreed to specially allocate the depreciation deduction
to B, the possibility existed that the building would decline in value. If the
building had been later sold at a price below its original cost, B would have
41
in fact received less sale proceeds than A. Therefore, the special allocation
accompanied by the gain chargeback provision has substantial economic effect
even though the allocation never actually affected the partners' shares of the
dollars generated by the partnership. 42 Through the gain chargeback provision,
B will suffer economically upon the property's sale only to the extent the de43
preciation deductions actually reflect a decline in the value of the building.
Thus, the special allocation of a depreciation deduction, coupled with a gain chargeback
provision, can produce an overall economic gain for the specially allocated partner, even
though the partnership property subject to the special allocation does not increase in value.
In the above illustration, the economic gain arose because the depreciation deductions generated a 50% tax savings while the gain attributable to those same deductions was taxed at
an effective rate of 20%. Obviously, this favorable result can only occur where the partnership gain attributable to the depreciation deductions is treated as a long-term capital gain
and thus subject to the lower effective tax rate.
0 The building is depreciable property used in the trade or business which has been held
for more than one year by the partnership at the time of the sale. I.R.C. § 1231(b)(1) (1976).
Therefore, B would treat the gain as being from the sale or exchange of a capital asset held
for more than one year, assuming he has no other recognized gains or losses from § 1231(b)(1)
assets during the year. Id. §§ 1231(a) & 702(a)(3). Since the gain is treated as long-term capital
gain, B can exclude 60% of the gain from his taxable income, assuming he has no recognized
losses from the sale or exchange of a capital asset during the year. Id. § 1202(a). Therefore,
B would include only 40% of the $10,000 partnership gain, or $4,000, in his taxable income.
Since B is in the 50% tax bracket, the tax on the $4,000 taxable portion of the gain would
be $2,000. The effective tax rate applicable to the gain would thus be 20%.
*
Since B is in the 50% tax bracket, the $10,000 depreciation deduction would generate a
tax savings of $5,000.
39. See Orrisch v. Commissioner, 55 T.C. 395, 403 (1970). In Orrisch, the Tax Court
stated that where property, subject to a special allocation of depreciation coupled with a
gain chargeback provision, "is sold at a gain, the special allocation will affect only the tax
liabilities of the partners and will have no other economic effect." (emphasis added). Id.
40. Treas. Reg. § 1.704-I(b)(2) (1956). In other words, a special allocation does not have
to actually affect the partners' shares as long as the possibility exists that the special allocation may have an economic effect on the partners.
41. Assume the building was sold for $145,000 at the end of year 1. The partnership
would recognize a $5,000 gain from the sale, that being the difference between the amount
realized, $145,000, and the partnership's adjusted basis in the building, $140,000. Because of
the gain chargeback provision, B would be allocated the entire $5,000 gain, thus increasing
his capital account from $65,000 to $70,000. The sale proceeds would then be divided in accordance with the partners' capital accounts. A would receive $75,000 and B would receive
$70,000. Therefore, the special allocation would have affected the partners' shares of the
sale proceeds even though a gain chargeback provision was used.
42.

See IV. McKEE, W. NELSON & R. WHITMIRE, supra note 9, § 10.02(2)(a); A. WILLTS,

J. PENNELL & P. POSTLEWAITE, supra note 9, § 86.04; Caruthers, supra note 36, at 130; Solomon,
supra note 23, at 13-20; Weidner, supra note 9, at 491-92.
43. W. McKEE. IV. NELSON & R. WmTmRE, supra note 9, § 10.02(2)(a); Solomon, supra

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol35/iss5/3

8

Graham: Partnership Special Alloctions: The Effect of Proposed Regulation
1983]

PARTNERSHIP SPECIAL ALLOCATIONS

The Negative Capital Account
*Although the capital accounts analysis appears to be a simple method for
testing substantial economic effect, it becomes more complex when applied to
special allocations involving negative capital accounts. 44 Assume individuals
A and B form the AB partnership to own and operate an apartment building.
The partners each contribute $150,000 cash and agree to share all profits and
losses from the partnership equally, except for a $100,000 annual depreciation
deduction 45 which is specially allocated to B. The partnership purchases an
apartment building for $1,500,000, making a down payment of $300,000, with
the seller taking a recourse mortgage for the balance.
In the first year, rental income equals cash operating expenses, and the
partnership suffers an overall tax loss of $100,000 which is allocated entirely to
B. At the end of the first year, the basis 46 and capital accounts of A and B are
as follows:
B

A
Basis

Capital
Account

Basis

Capital
Account

Beginning of Year 1
Operating Profit or Loss
Depreciation Deduction

$750,000

$150,000

$750,000

$150,000

-.

-

-

-

-

-

(100,000)

(100,000)

End of Year 1

$750,000

$150,000

$650,000

$ 50,000

note 23, at 13-19. Although the partnership agreement should contain a gain chargeback
provision to insure that the partner receiving the specially allocated depreciation deductions
will suffer economically only to the extent the depreciation deductions are an accurate reflection of economic reality, the presence or absence of a gain chargeback provision should be an
irrelevant factor when testing the special allocation for substantial economic effect. The
special allocation of the depreciation deductions has substantial economic effect as long as
the partner receiving the benefit of such allocations bears the risk that he will receive a
smaller share of the sale proceeds in the event the property subject to the special allocations
is later disposed of for an amount below its original cost. The partner receiving the special
allocation of the depreciation deductions will bear this economic risk regardless of whether
the partnership agreement contains a gain chargeback provision. See Orrisch v. Commissioner,
55 T.C. 395, 403-04 (1970); Cates, supra note 24, at 205.
44. A partner's capital account may have a deficit balance in two situations. One situation occurs where the partner has withdrawn cash from the partnership in excess of the sum
of his capital contribution and share of the partnership's cumulative income. The other
situation arises where the partner's share of partnership deductions or losses exceeds the sum
of his capital contribution and cumulative share of the partnership income. W. McKEE,
W. NELSON & R. WHrrMntE, supra note 9, § 10.02(2)(b).
45. The partnership elects to depreciate the building over a fifteen-year period under
the straight line method, thus allowing for a $100,000 annual depreciation deduction.
46. A partner's basis in his partnership interest is the sum of the money contributed
plus the adjusted basis of any property contributed to the partnership. I.R.C. § 722 (1976).
An increase in a partner's share of the partnership liabilities is generally treated as a contribution of cash by the partner. Id. § 752(a). The partners' shares of partnership recourse
liabilities are determined in accordance with the partners' ratios for sharing partnership losses.
Treas. Reg. § 1.752-1(e) (1956). Therefore, A and B each have a $750,000 basis in their partnership interest, which consists of the $150,000 cash contributed plus the $600,000 share of the
partnership liabilities.
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If the partnership also breaks even from a cash income/expense standpoint in
year 2, the special allocation of the depreciation deduction to B will create a
$50,000 deficit in his capital account, determined as follows:
A

B

Basis

Capital
Account

Basis

Capital
Account

$750,000

$150,000

$650,000

$ 50,000

Operating Profit or Loss

-

-

-

-

Depreciation Deduction

-

-

(100,000)

(100,000)

$750,000

$150,000

$550,000

($ 50,000)

Beginning of Year 2

End of Year 2

Assume the partnership sells the building at the end of the second year
for $1,300,000 and then liquidates. The partnership will use $1,200,000 of the
sale proceeds to pay off the mortgage. Under Orrisch47 and Magaziner,48 the
remaining $100,000 of sale proceeds must be distributed in accordance with
the partners' capital account balances. Since B has a deficit balance in his
capital account, the entire $100,000 would be distributed to A. The sale of
the building and distribution of the proceeds would affect the partners' capital
accounts and basis as follows:
A

End of Year 2 - Before
Sale of Building

B

Basis

Capital
Account

Basis

Capital
Account

$750,000

5150,000

$550,000

($50,000)

-

-

Partnership Gain (Loss)
from Sale of Building

-

Distribution of Sales
Proceeds

Effect of Reduction of
Partnership Liabilities "9
Gain (Loss) Recognized 5o
Upon Liquidation of
Partnership

(100,000)

(100,000)

(600,000)

-

(600,000)

($ 50,000)

($ 50,000)

$ 50,000

-

$50,000

47. 55 T.C. 395, 404 (1970), aff'd per curiam, 31 A.F.T.R.2d 1069 (9th Cir. 1973). See
supra notes 18-23 and accompanying text.
48. 37 T.C.M. 873, 875 (1978). See supra notes 25-26 and accompanying text.
49. When a partner's share of the partnership liabilities is decreased, the amount of the
decrease is treated as a distribution of money to the partner by the partnership. I.R.C.
§ 752(b) (1976). A partner's basis in his partnership interest is reduced by the amount of any
money distributed to him by the partnership. Id. § 733(1). Therefore, when the partnership
pays off the $1,200,000 recourse mortgage, A and B will each reduce their basis in their
partnership interest by $600,000.
50. If a partner receives a distribution of money in excess of his basis in his partnership
interest, a gain must be recognized. Id. § 731(a)(1). Under § 752(b), B is deemed to have
received $600,000 of money, which is $50,000 greater than his adjusted basis of $550,000.
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Consequently, the partnership's $200,000 economic loss51 was borne $50,000
by A and $150,000 by B. Although B ultimately paid for the $200,000 of
specially allocated depredation deductions, the debt was paid with $150,000
cash and a $50,000 taxable gain. This result violates the Magaziner rule requiring "the partner who benefits from a special allocation must bear the
entire economic cost of such deductions."52 Therefore, the special allocation
of the depredation deduction to B will have substantial economic effect only
if he bears the economic cost of the deduction.
In year 1, B actually suffered the economic burden of the special allocation
since his capital account was reduced by the amount of the deduction. Therefore, the year 1 special allocation had substantial economic effect. In year 2,
the special allocation reduced B's capital account to a deficit of $50,000. Assuming the depredation deductions reflect economic reality and the building
is sold for $1,800,000 at the end of year 2, B will only bear $150,000 of the
economic cost of the depredation deductions. The year 2 special allocation
thus lacks substantial economic effect and will be disallowed under section

704(o)(2).--

A special allocation which creates a negative capital account will be disallowed unless the partner is legally accountable to the partnership for the
deficit capital account. For example, the partnership agreement or state law
could require that any partner with a deficit capital account is liable to the
partnership upon liquidation for the amount of the deficit.54 Applying this
requirement to the above facts, B will be obligated to contribute an additional
$50,000 to the partnership, which will be distributed to A in satisfaction of
his remaining capital account. Since B now bears the full economic burden of

Therefore, B will recognize a $50,000 gain. A, on the other hand, will recognize a $50,000 loss
since the amount of cash he was deemed to have received is $50,000 less than his adjusted
basis of $650,000. Id. § 731(a)(2).
51. The partnership purchased the building for $1,500,000 and later sold it for $1,300,000.
Therefore, a $200,000 economic loss was sustained.
52. 37 T.C.M. 873, 875 (1978) (emphasis added). See also Orrisch v. Commissioner, 55
T.C. 395, 403 (1970), where the Tax Court also inquired whether the partner would bear
the "economic burden" of the specially allocated depreciation deduction. Economic burden
means the risk of the economic decline in the property's value associated with the depreciation deductions must be secured by real dollars, as opposed to tax dollars.
53. See, e.g., W. McKxa, W. NELSON & R. WnrrmmE, supra note 9, § 10.02(2)(b);
A. WILLIS, J. PENNELL & P. PoSnrLwArm, supra note 9, § 86.05; Cowan, supra note 23, at
23-14, 23-15; Krane & Sheffield, supra note 31, at 943-45; Solomon, supra note 23, at 13-23;
Weidner, supra note 9, at 491-94.
54. See Park Cities Corp. v. Byrd, 534 S.W.2d 668, 673-74 (Tex. 1976), where the court
found a general partner's negative capital account, caused by the special allocation of depreciation deductions and not cash withdrawals, to be a debt owed to the partnership. As a
result, the general partner was required to contribute $1,987,344 to the partnership upon
liquidation to replenish her deficit capital account to zero.
The partnership agreement should state whether or not a partner is to be liable for a
negative capital account caused by an allocation of partnership losses or deductions since
§ 18(a) of the Uniform Partnership Act does not specifically address this issue. Under §§ 16
and 17 of the Uniform Limited Partnership Act, a limited partner is not legally liable for a
deficit capital account caused by an allocation of partnership losses or deductions.
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the depreciation deductions, the year 2 special allocation has substantial economic effect. 55
55. Absent such a requirement, the partner with the negative capital account does not
bear the economic burden of the specially allocated deduction or loss as required by
Magaziner and Orrisch. As a result, most commentators have included a legal accountability
provision in the capital accounts analysis test. See supra note 53. For a contrary argument,
see Caruthers, supra note 36, at 131-32; Cates, supra note 24, at 206. This contrary argument
states that the substantial economic effect test, as interpreted by the Treasury Regulations
and the Senate Finance Committee Report, may not require that the specially allocated
partner be legally obligated upon liquidation of the partnership to restore his deficit
capital account resulting from the special allocation of losses or deductions. The Treasury
Regulations and the Senate Finance Committee Report only require that the special allocation "may actually affect the dollar amount of the partners' shares of the total partnership
income or loss" in order to pass the substantial economic effect test (emphasis added). Treas.
Reg. § 1.704-1(b)(2) (1956). If the partner is legally obligated to restore his negative capital
account upon liquidation, such a standard would require "absolute economic effect" rather
than the presumably lesser standard of substantial economic effect. The special allocation of
a deduction or loss, coupled with a gain chargeback provision, would restore the partner's
negative capital account as long as the unrealized partnership gain, subject to the gain
chargeback provision, is at least equal to the sum of the specially allocated deductions or
losses. The preceding proposition assumes the partner would not be allowed to create a
deficit capital account through excessive cash withdrawals from the partnership. Since the
special allocation of the deduction or loss, coupled with a gain chargeback provision, may
actually have an effect on the partner's share of the partnership income and also possibly
cause the restoration of the partner's negative capital account, such special allocation
arguably possesses substantial economic effect where it creates a deficit capital account even
though the partner is not legally responsible for such deficit. An example will serve to more
clearly illustrate this argument.
Assume individuals A and B form the AB partnership to acquire and operate an apartment building, with each partner contributing $300,000 cash. AB purchases the apartment
building for $3,000,000, making a cash downpayment of $600,000 and executing a recourse
mortgage for $2,400,000. The partners agree to share the partnership profits and losses
equally, except for a $200,000 annual depreciation deduction which is specially allocated to B.
The partnership elects to depreciate the building under the straight line method over 15
years, so an annual depreciation deduction of $200,000 is allowable. The partnership agreement further provides that neither partner is to be held legally responsible for a deficit
capital account. The partnership agreement also contains a gain chargeback provision. If
the partnership breaks even for the first two years from an operating standpoint (excluding
consideration of the depreciation deductions), the basis and capital accounts of the partners
at the end of year 2 would be as follows:
A
Basis

B
Capital
Account

Basis

Capital
Account

Capital Contribution

$300,000

$300,000

$300,000

$300,000

Effect of Partnership
Liabilities

1,200,000

-

1,200,000

-

Operating Profit or
Loss
Depreciation Deductions Year 1
Year 2
Balance at End of
Year 2

....
$1,500,000
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837

The Effect of NonrecourseDebt
The capital accounts analysis becomes even more troublesome when applied to special allocations of depreciation deductions attributable to nonrecourse debt. 5 6 The capital accounts analysis is predicated on the notion that
Assume the partnership sells the apartment building at the end of year 2 for $2,700,000.
The partnership realizes a $100,000 gain, which is the excess of the amount realized,
$2,700,000, over the building's adjusted basis, $2,600,000. I.R.C. § 1001(a) (1976). Under
§ 1001(c), the partnership must recognize the $100,000 gain. The gain chargeback provision
would have the following effect on the partners basis and capital accounts:
A

B

Basis

Capital
Account

Basis

Capital
Account

Balance Before Sale of
the Building

$1,500,000

$300,000

$1,100,000

($100,000)

Partnership Gain from
Sale of Building

-

-

$1,500,000

SS00,000

Balance

100,000
$1,200,000

100,000
S 0

After paying off the $2,400,000 recourse mortgage, the partnership has $300,000 of sale
proceeds for distribution to the partners. The capital accounts analysis requires the $500,000
be distributed to A in satisfaction of his capital account. Note that B eventually suffered the
entire economic burden associated with the specially allocated depreciation deductions even
though the year 2 allocation created a negative capital account. The specially allocated
depreciation deductions also had an effect on the partners' shares of the sale proceeds. As
long as the building's value exceeds the principal amount of the recourse mortgage, the
specially allocated depreciation deductions will have some effect on the partners' shares of
any sale proceeds. In year 2, when B received the $200,000 specially allocated depreciation
deduction, the possibility existed that such allocation might actually have an effect on his
future share of any sale proceeds generated by a disposition of the building. Since the year 2
special allocation may actually have an effect on the partner's share of the dollars attributable
to the future partnership operations, the year 2 allocation arguably has substantial economic
effect, even though B is not legally liable for the deficit capital account the allocation would
create. This argument, though, obviously ignores the requirement prescribed by Orrisch
that the partner must bear the full economic cost or burden associated with the specially
allocated deduction or loss. See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
56. The source of the tax issues associated with deductions attributable to nonrecourse
debt is Crane v. Commissioner, 331 U.S. 1 (1947). Crane indirectly held that a taxpayer is
entitled to include the principal balance of a nonrecourse note in the property's cost basis.
The Crane rule effectively allows a taxpayer to currently take those depreciation deductions
attributable to nonrecourse debt that he will later pay for in real dollars when he makes the
mortgage payments. See Bittker, Tax Shelters, Nonrecourse Debt, and the Crane Case, 33 TAX
L. REv. 277, 283 (1978). If the taxpayer refuses to pay the mortgage and the mortgagee is
forced to foreclose, the taxpayer is still required to pay for the depreciation deductions, but
with tax dollars instead of real dollars. This results because Crane also requires the taxpayer
to include the principal amount of the nonrecourse note in his amount realized if the
property is later disposed of or sold.
Congress has attempted to remedy the effect of the Crane rule by disallowing certain
deductions attributable to nonrecourse debt. See I.R.C. § 465(a) (West Supp. 1983); I.R.C.
§ 704(d) (Supp. III 1979). The "At Risk" provisions, however, specifically exempt xeal estate
activities. I.R.C. § 465(c)(3)(D) (Supp. V 1981). Furthermore, § 752(a) allows a partner to
treat his share of the nonrecourse note as a cash contribution for basis purposes under
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the partner who benefits from a special allocation must bear the economic
burden of the depreciation deduction. 57 With nonrecourse financing, however,
it is the mortgage lender who bears the economic burden.5 8 To illustrate,
assume A and B each contribute $2,000 to AB, a newly formed partnership.
The partnership purchases an apartment building for $150,000, making a cash
down payment of $4,000 and executing a $146,000 nonrecourse note for the
balance. The partners agree to share all profits and losses equally, except for
a $10,000 annual depreciation deduction which is specially allocated to B. The
first year operations of AB are summarized as follows:
Operating profit or loss (excluding depreciation)
Depreciation Deduction
Principal Payment on the Nonrecourse Note
Fair market value of property at end of Year 1

-0$ 10,000
-0$140,000

The basis and capital accounts of A and B will be as follows:
A

B

Basis

Capital
Account

Basis

Capital
Account

Capital Contribution

$ 2,000

$2,000

$ 2,000

$ 2,000

Effect of Partnership
Liabilities 9

73,000

-

73,000

-

Operating Profit or Loss
Depreciation Deduction

Balance at end of Year 1

-

-

$75,000

-

(10,000)

(10,000)

$2,000

$65,000

($ 8,000)

Since the fair market value of the building at the end of year 1 is less than
the principal balance of the nonrecourse note, AB might refuse to pay off the
note. Upon default by AB, the nonrecourse lender would foreclose on the
property and realize a $6,000 loss. 0 The foreclosure would also cause AB to
realize and recognize a $6,000 gain, 61 which would be allocated entirely to
§ 704(d). Treas. Reg. § 1.752-1(e) (1956). Therefore, the effect of the Crane rule is still alive
if the partnership involved is a real estate partnership. As a result, the problem concerning
special allocations of deductions attributable to nonrecourse debt should not arise except
where the partnership involved is engaging in a real estate activity.
57. See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
58. If the fair market value of the property falls below the principal balance of the
nonrecourse debt, the partnership is likely to default on the note. The lender will then be
forced to foreclose and will bear the entire economic loss since the partners are not personally liable for the deficiency.
59. Each partner is treated as having made a cash contribution of $73,000 to the partnership for his share of the partnership's nonrecourse debt of $146,000. I.R.C. § 752(a) (1956);
Treas. Reg. § 1.752-1(e) (1956). This deemed cash contribution increases each partner's basis
in his partnership interest. I.R.C. § 722 (1976).
60. The lender loaned AB $146,000 on a nonrecourse basis and would realize only
$140,000 from a sale of the property at its fair market value. The lender would realize a

$6,000 loss.
61. According to the Crane holding, the partnership must include the principal balance
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B.62 The foreclosure would have the following effect on the partners' basis and
capital accounts:
A

End of Year 1
Partnership Gain on
Foreclosure
Balance

B

Basis

Capital
Account

Basis

Capital
Account

$75,000

$2,000

$65,000

($8,000)

-

-

6,000

6,000

$75,000

$2,000

$71,000

($2,000)

Upon liquidation of the partnership, A would recognize a $2,000 loss and B
63

a $2,000 gain.
In the above example, the economic burden associated with the $10,000
depreciation deduction was borne $2,000 by A, $2,000 by B and $6,000 by the
nonrecourse lender. Clearly, this special allocation provision does not have
substantial economic effect. The question thus arises whether special allocations of deductions attributable to nourecourse debt can ever have substantial
economic effect. 64
One leading commentator has concluded that special allocations of deductions attributable to nonrecourse debt can be sustained. 65 McKee suggests that

the partner benefiting from the special allocation should also be allocated the
partnership income which results from the property securing the debt and
of the nonrecourse note in its amount realized under § 1001(b) (1976). Recently, the Supreme
Court held the Crane rule to be applicable even where the fair market value of the property
is less than the principal amount of the nonrecourse debt. Commissioner v. Tufts, 103 S. Ct.
1826 (1983). The partnership realized a $6,000 gain, the difference between the amount
realized, $146,000, and the partnership's adjusted basis, $140,000. I.R.C. § 1001(a) (1976).
Under I.R.C. § 1001(c) (1976), the partnership would be required to recognize the $6,000
gain.
62. The partnership agreement contains a gain chargeback provision. Thus, the gain
must be charged to the partner who benefited from the special allocation.
63. The reduction in the partners' shares of the partnership's nonrecourse debt is
treated as a cash distribution of $73,000 to each of the partners. I.R.C. § 752(b) (1976). Since
B is deemed to have received $73,000, which is greater than his adjusted basis in his partnership interest, he will recognize a $2,000 gain. Id. § 731(a)(1). A is deemed to have received
$73,000, but has a $75,000 adjusted basis in his partnership interest. A will recognize a
$2,000 loss. Id. § 731(a)(2).

64. The commentators have disagreed as to the correct answer to this question. See
generally W. McKEE, W. NELSON & R. WsrrMiRE, supra note 9, § 10.03(2); A. Wiu.Ls, J. PENNELL & P. PosrELwArrE, supra note 9, § 82-11; Cates, supra note 24, at 207-08; Cowan, supra
note 23, at 23-17 to 23-24; Krane & Sheffield, supra note 31, at 947-49; Schapiro, Bierman,
Reichler, Leder, Dixon & Gardner, Disproportionate Profits, Losses and Capital Interests,
Special Allocations, GuaranteedPayments, Timing Problems, Cash Flow, 32 N.Y.U. INST. ON
Fm. TAX'N 1541, 1554-64 (1974); Solomon, supra note 23, at 13-23 to -27; Weidner, supra
note 9, at 495-504; A.L.I. Fed. Income Tax Project, Tentative Draft No. 3 at 114-26 (Mar. 27,
1979).
65. W. MCKEE, W. NELSON & R. WHrrMmE, supra note 9, § 10.03(2); McKee, Partnership
Allocations in Real Estate Ventures: Crane, Kresser and Orrisch, 30 TAx L. REv. 1, 28-35

(1979).
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which is ultimately used to extinguish the nonrecourse debt.

6

McKee's ration-

ale is that a partner receiving a specially allocated depreciation deduction
should receive the same tax treatment as an individual owner of depreciable

66. To better understand the McKee analysis, consider the following example. Assume
that G, the general partner, and L, the limited partner, form the limited partnership GL to
own and operate an apartment building. GL purchases an apartment building for $150,000
by executing a nonrecourse note. The partners agree the $10,000 allowable depreciation
deduction is to be specially allocated to L as well as any partnership income used by GL to
satisfy the nonrecourse note. Otherwise, the partners agree to share the partnership profits
and losses equally. GL's first year of operations is summarized below:
Operating profit or loss (excluding depreciation)

$20,000

Depreciation Deduction

$10,000

Principal Payment on the Nonrecourse Note

$10,000

Fair market value of property at end of Year 1

$140,000

The year I operations will have the following effect on the partners' basis and capital accounts:
G
Basis
Capital Contribution
Effect of Partnership
Liabilities

-

$75,000

Operating Profit

5,000

Depreciation Deduction

-

Cash Distributions

(5,000)

Mortgage Payment

(5,000)

Balance at end of Year 1

L
Capital
Account

$70,000

Basis

Capital
Account

-

-

$75,000

-

$5,000

15,000

-

(10,000)

(10,000)

(5,000)

(5,000)

(5,000)
$0

(5,000)
$70,000

$15,000

$0

McKee argues the economic burden requirement of Orrisch has been met since L has not
taken a depreciation deduction that was borne economically by G, and thus the special
allocation should be sustained. W. McKEE, W. NELSON & R. W=TMtIu, supra note 9,
§ 10.03(2), 10-34; McKee, supra note 65, at 30. For another discussion of McKee's views concerning special allocations of losses or deductions attributable to nonrecourse debt, see
Bower and Larson, The Proposed Regulations Under Section 704(b), TAX NOTES 667, 669-70
(May 23, 1983).
The McKee analysis would also require that the partnership agreement contain a gain
chargeback provision so that any gain recognized by the partnership, in the event of a foreclosure by the nonrecourse lender, would be charged to L. A brief example will explain the
rationale for a gain chargeback provision in this situation. Assume the same facts as above,
except the partnership does not make the mortgage payment and the lender forecloses. The
partnership would realize a $10,000 gain, that being the difference between the principal
balance of the nonrecourse note, $150,000, and the building's adjusted basis. $140,000. This
gain would be charged to L. The result of the year I operations and the foreclosure would
be as follows:
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property. 67 Theoretically, with the allocation of the future income, the benefited partner is better able to bear the entire economic burden of the depreciation deduction. Although some commentators claim the McKee analysis is
flawed,6B an examination of the Proposed Regulations will reveal the Department of the Treasury apparently agrees with McKee's conclusions6 9
L

G

Capital

Capital
Basis
Capital Contribution
Effect of Partnership
Liabilities
Operating Profit
Depreciation Deduction
Cash Distribution
Partnership Gain on
Foreclosure
Balance Before Liquidation

Account

-

$75,000

$75,000

-

10,000

10,000

10,000

-

(10,000)

(10,000)

(10,000)

(10,000)

(10,000)

-

10,000

10,000

$0

$75,000

$0

(10,000)

Account

-

-

10,000

Basis

-

$75,000

Arguably, once again, the special allocation should be sustained since L's depreciation deduction was not borne economically by G. See McKee, supra note 65, at 32; cf. Cates, supra
note 24, at 207-08.
67. W. McKE, W. Nm.SON & R. WHTrmIE, supra note 9, § 10.03(2), 10-27.
68. One criticism is McKee's comparison of the individual property owner with the
partner receiving the special depreciation allocation. See Weidner, supra note 9, at 496. The
author states this comparison is not a valid one. "[T]he sole owner has all the benefits and
burdens of property ownership, both tax and economic" whereas in the partnership situation,
the partners axe attempting to separate economic benefits from tax benefits. Id. See also
Solomon, supra note 23, at 13-24. The author argues McKee's analysis is fallacious since the
sole owner is clearly entitled to all of the depreciation, while the partner is less than a 100%
owner who is attempting to claim all of the depreciation.
A second major criticism is that the gain/income chargeback provision advocated by
McKee can never have an economic effect on the partners. This argument states that the
economic dollars generated by the property subject to the nonrecourse debt will always be
shared equally by the partners if McKee's gain/income chargeback provision is utilized.
Therefore, the special allocation can never "actually affect the dollar amount of the partners'
shares of the total partnership income or loss" as required by Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(b)(2). See
Krane &: Sheffield, supra note 31, at 947; Schapiro, Bierman, Reichler, Leder, Dixon &
Gardner, supra note 64, at 1556. One author suggests that "a special allocation of depreciation
attributable to nonrecourse indebtedness should be accompanied by a gain chargeback provision which applies only to a disposition of partnership property" rather than to both
partnership income used to pay the nonrecourse debt and gain recognized from a subsequent
disposition of the property. Solomon, supra note 28, at 13-26 to -27. Where such a gain
chargeback provision is implemented by the partners, the special allocation will have substantial economic effect if the property is sold for a price equal to its adjusted basis after
the nonrecourse debt has been paid off. The partner who received the specially allocated
depreciation deduction would suffer economically to the extent of the depreciation deductions since his capital account would reflect the depreciation deductions. Since the possibility
would exist that the special allocation might have an effect on the partners' shares of the
sale proceeds, the author argues the allocation should be sustained. Id. at 13-26.
69. Mr. McKee was serving as Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary for Tax Policy in the
Department of the Treasury at the time the proposed regulations were promulgated.
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The Proposed Regulations
The Proposed Regulations-0 formulate a two-step test for determining
whether a special allocation meets the substantial economic effect prerequisite
of section 704(b)(2). The first requirement is that the special allocation must
have an "economic effect.' 71 Under this requirement, any economic benefit or
burden associated with the special allocation must actually affect the dollar
72
amount received by the partner to whom the allocation was made.
According to the Proposed Regulations, a special allocation will not generally have economic effect unless three conditions are satisfied. First, the
special allocation must be appropriately reflected by an increase or decrease in
that partner's capital account. 73 Second, liquidation proceeds must be distributed in accordance with the partners' capital account balances.7 4 Finally,
following the distribution of liquidation proceeds, any partner who has a
deficit in his capital account must be obligated to restore the amount of such
deficit to the partnership. This amount is to be paid to creditors or distributed
75
to the partners in accordance with their positive capital account balances. If
these capital account rules are not followed by the partnership, the special allocation will nevertheless have economic effect where the partnership agreement
"would in all cases ... produce the same results as if the [capital account] requirements ... had been satisfied."7 6
The economic effect test will be applied at the end of the partnership's
taxable year. If a special allocation has economic effect for the year in question,
it will be allowed even though allocations for future years may lack economic
effect. For example, a special allocation will be permitted, where the allocation
does not create a negative capital account even though the partner is not
legally required to replenish a deficit in his capital account. In determining
whether a special allocation will produce a deficit capital account, however,
any partnership cash and property which is reasonably expected to be distributed before a parallel increase to the capital account occurs will be deemed
77
to have been distributed on the final day of the partnership's taxable year.
70. A Treasury Regulation is an official interpretation of an Internal Revenue Code
section and is normally binding on the taxpayer unless such interpretation conflicts with
congressional intent. A Proposed Regulation, on the other hand, has no current legal effect.
It does serve, however, to place taxpayers on notice as to the Internal Revenue Service's
probable interpretation of an Internal Revenue Code section once such a regulation is
adopted in its final form.
71. Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(b)(2)(i), 48 Fed. Reg. 9871 (1983).
72. Id. § 1.704-1(b)(2)(ii). Note that the Proposed Regulations are changing the current
standard of whether the special allocation "may actually affect the . . . partners' shares of
the total partnership income" to iequire that the special allocation "will actually affect (to
the same extent) the dollar amount [of partnership income] received by such partner." Id.
73. Id. § 1.704-1(b)(2)(ii)(a).
74. Id. § 1.704-1(b)(2)(ii)(b).
75. Id. § 1.704-I(b)(2)(ii)(c). The Proposed Regulations have essentially adopted the
capital accounts analysis, along with the additional requirement that partners be liable
upon liquidation for the amount of any deficit in their capital accounts.
76. Id. § 1.704-1(b)(2)(iv)(b).
77. Id. § 1.704-1(b)(2)(ii).
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The second requirement under the Proposed Regulations is that the economic effect be "substantial" after taking into account all prior and anticipated future allocations.- In determining whether the economic effect is substantial, "the likelihood and magnitude of a shift in the economic consequences among partners must be weighed against the shifting of tax consequences resulting from the allocation." In other words, the economic effect of
the special allocation must be substantial when compared to its tax effect. In
determining the tax effect of a special allocation, the tax consequences resulting
from "the interaction of the allocation (or allocations) with the partners'
nonpartnership tax attributes must be considered."7 9
78. Id. § 1.704-1(b)(2)(iii)(a).
79. Id. The "substantiality" requirement was recommended by the American Law Institute's Proposals for Changes in the Rules for Taxation of Partners. The American Law

Institute recommended that the Txeasury Regulations under § 704 contain the following
statement: "In determining whether an allocation may have a substantial economic effect,
the likelihood and magnitude of the economic effect must be weighed against the shifting of
tax consequences resulting from the allocation." A.L.I. Fed. Income Tax Project Tent. Draft
No. 3, Part E at 138 (Mar. 27, 1979).
The Proposed Regulations list additional factors to be considered when comparing the
shifting of economic consequences against the shifting of tax consequences:
[W]hether the partnership or a partner individually has a non-tax business purpose
for the allocation; whether related items of income, gain, loss, deduction, and credit
from the same source are subject to the same allocation; whether the allocation was
made without recognition of normal business factors; whether the allocation was made
only after the amount thereof could reasonably be estimated; the duration of the
allocation; and the overall tax consequences of the allocation.
Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(b)(2)(iii)(b), 48 Fed. Reg. 9871 (1983). These factors are also
utilized by the current Treasury Regulations for determining whether the "principal purpose" of a special allocation is the avoidance of taxes, as prohibited by old § 704(b)(2). Treas.
Reg. § L.704(b)(2) (1956). The only authority for the resurrection of these factors is contained in the Senate Finance Committee Report that accompanied the amendment of Tax
Reform Act of 1976 to § 704(b)(2). The Senate Finance Committee Report stated: "Other
factors that could possibly relate to the determination of the validity of an allocation are
set forth under the present regulations (i.e., Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(b)(2) (1956))." S. RFP. No.
938, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., 100 (1976), reprinted in 1976-3 C.B. 138. The courts gave little
weight to these factors when testing the tax validity of special allocations under old
§ 704(b)(2). See, e.g., Hamilton v. United States, 687 F.2d 408, 414 (Ct. Cl. 1982), where the
Court of Claims stated:
The italicized section of the regulation [substantial economic effect] is the key factor
to be considered in any analysis of the viability of a special allocation. An allocation
that lacks "substantial economic effect" will not be saved by meeting the other five factors in the regulation, and it is unlikely that an allocation that has "substantial economic effect" would not also meet the other factors.
Commentators have also stated that after the 1976 Tax Reform Act's amendment to
§ 704(b)(2), these factors should be accorded little weight in testing special allocations. See
W. McKrE, W. NELsON & R. WHrrMr E, supra note 9, § 10.02(3); Cates, supra note 24, at 203;
Solomon, supra note 2,3 at 13-10. Perhaps the Proposed Regulations are adopting the prior
law's principal purpose test, rather than attempting to define the substantial element of the
statutory test prescribed by § 704(b)(2). If so, such action would clearly appear to be in cohflict with congressional intent. The Senate Finance Committee Report that accompanied the
Tax Reform Act of 1976's amendment to § 704(b)(2) specifically addresses how substantial
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This determination of substantial economic effect will be made in light of
the facts and circumstances existing at the beginning of the taxable year in
question. If there is a strong likelihood at the beginning of the taxable year
that a special allocation will generate a disproportionately greater shift in tax
consequences than in economic consequences, such allocations' economic effect
will not be "substantial." 0 Where significant tax consequences actually result
from a special allocation, a rebuttable presumption arises that the strong likelihood existed at the beginning of the taxable year."' The substantial test should
be restricted to situations where partnership income, gains, losses or deductions are being allocated disproportionately among the partners because of
their individual tax situations.
Special allocations which possess "transitory" economic effect will not meet
the substantial requirement. The economic effect is transitory if a "strong
likelihood" exists that the economic effect will be offset in a future year. 2 For
example, a special allocation has transitory economic effect where one partner
receives a special allocation of income in one year and the other partners re83
ceive a similar allocation in a later year.
The transitory economic effect rule may also apply to special allocations of
deductions or losses, coupled with gain chargeback provisions. The rule applies if a "substantial likelihood" exists when the special allocations are made
that the property subject to the gain chargeback will not decrease in value

economic effect should be interpreted: "[T]he committee believes that allocations of special
items and overall allocations should be restricted to those situations where the allocations
have substantial economic effect, as presently interpreted by the regulations and case law."
(emphasis added). S. REP. No. 938, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., 99-100 (1976), reprinted in 1976-3 C.B.
137-38. The House Ways and Means Committee had proposed a dual test for special allocations. The House's version would have required special allocations to be motivated by "a
business purpose and that no significant tax avoidance or evasion of tax results from the
allocation." H. REP. No. 658, 94th Cong., Ist Sess. 126 (1976), reprinted in 1976-3 C.B. 818.
The Senate rejected the House's dual test in favor of substantial economic effect: "Because of
the use of the phrase 'significant avoidance or evasion of any tax . . . results' tinder the
House bill, a conceivable interpretation might cause the disallowance of a special allocation
to a high bracket taxpayer, notwithstanding that the allocation had a business purpose and
economic substance." (emphasis added). S. REP. No. 938, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 100 n.ll (1976),
reprinted in 1976-3 C.B. 138. The Senate's standard was ultimately adopted by Congress.
S. REP. No. 1236, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 422 (1976), reprinted in 1976-3 C.B. 826. The legislative
history thus seems to clearly indicate that whether a special allocation has substantial economic effect is to be determined by examining "whether the allocation may actually affect the
dollar amount of the partners' shares of the total partnership income or loss independently
of tax consequences." Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(b)(2) (1956). If the special allocation will actually
affect the partners' shares of the income economically, then the allocation should have substantial economic effect regardless of its tax consequences to the partners.
80. Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(b)(2)(iii)(a), 48 Fed. Reg. 9871 (1983).
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id. § 1.704-1(b)(5) ex. (8)(ii). Another example of transitory economic effect is where
a partner is specially allocated a taxable loss in one year, but a "strong likelihood" exists that
the taxable income for future years will offset the specially allocated loss. Id. § 1.704(b)(5)
ex. (2)(ii).
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below its original cost.8 4 As previously illustrated,5 a special allocation of a
deduction or loss, coupled with a gain chargeback provision, will not have any
economic effect on the partners' shares of sale proceeds if the property is sold
for a sum equal to or above the propertys original cost. If a substantial likelihood exists at the time the special allocation is made that the property will
not decrease in value, such allocation arguably possesses only transitory economic effect and should be disallowed.
This interpretation of the transitory economic effect restriction, however,
is not consistent with the Proposed Regulations' requirement that the partner
receiving a special allocation must actually bear the economic burden (if any)
attributable to the special allocation."( The Proposed Regulations provide
that if there is an economic burden or risk associated with the special allocation, the allocation can have economic effect only if it "will actually affect...
the dollar amount received by [the specially allocated] partner."Sr This statement seemingly requires a partner receiving a specially allocated deduction or
loss to forfeit an equal amount of future partnership income even though the
partnership may never suffer an economic loss as a result of the allocation.
However, this requirement applies only if the partnership has suffered an
economic loss attributable to the specially allocated deduction. Therefore, the
Proposed Regulations should not affect the use of gain chargeback provisions.
The Proposed Regulations, when enacted in their final form, would generally be effective for taxable years beginning after December 31, 1983.88 The
Proposed Regulations also provide, however, that "the fundamental principles
...relating to the substantial economic effect test are generally applicable for
partnership taxable years beginning after December 31, 1975."' 9 If "fundamental principles" include the capital account requirements,9 ° a retroactive
application of these rules would probably result in mass confusion and litigation. This potential conflict arises because the Proposed Regulations require
that capital accounts must be maintained in accordance with tax accounting
principles for an allocation of income, gain, loss or deduction to have economic effect.9 ' Conversely, the Staff of the Joint Committee on Taxation had
previously indicated that the substantial economic effect of a special allocation
should be determined under financial accounting principles. 92 Thus, most
taxpayers believed they were to maintain their capital accounts in accordance
with financial accounting principles instead of tax accounting principles. If
the Proposed Regulations' requirement that capital accounts must be maintained under tax accounting principles is one of the "fundamental principles,"
then many partnerships could be in serious trouble.
84. See Bower &Larson, supra note 66, at 673-74.
85. See supra notes 37-43 and accompanying text.
86. Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(b)(2)(ii), 48 Fed. Reg. 9871 (1983).
87.

Id.

88. Id. § 1.704-1(b)(1)(i).
89. Id.

90. Id. § 1.704-1(b)(2)(ii)(a)-(c).
91. Id. § 1.704-1(b)(2)(iv)(a).
92.

Staff of the Joint Comm. on Tax'n, General Explanation of the Tax Reform Act of

1976, at 95 n.6 (1976), reprintod it 1976-3 C.B. 107.
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Under tax accounting principles, a partner's capital account must be increased by the amount of money and the adjusted basis of any property he
contributes to the partnership. A partner's capital account must also be credited with his share of partnership income and gain 3 A partner's capital account must be decreased by the amount of any liabilities assumed by the partnership as well as any liabilities on the contributed property. In addition, the
Proposed Regulations require that a partner's capital account be decreased by
the amount of any money or the adjusted basis of any partnership property
distributed to him. 9 4 The partner's capital account will also be reduced by his

share of any loss and deduction of the partnership, and of partnership expenditures that were neither deductible expenses nor capital expenditure. 95
If a special allocation fails to meet these substantial economic effect requirements, such allocation can still satisfy section 704(b) in two other instances under the Proposed Regulations. The first situation occurs where the
partnership can show that, under all the facts and circumstances, the special
'
allocation is "in accordance with the partners' interests in the partnership."96
The partners' interests in the partnership are determined by examining their
distribution of the economic benefit or burden associated with the special
allocationY. Unless otherwise shown by the Service or the partnership, 8 the
partners' interests in the partnership are presumed to be equal.99

93. Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(b)(2)(iv)(a), 48 Fed. Reg. 9871 (1983).
94. Id. This amount is to be "net of liabilities assumed by such partner and liabilities to
which such distributed property is subject." Id.
95. Id.
96. Id. § 1.704-1(b)(1)(i).
97. Id. § 1.704-1(b)(3). In making this determination, the Service will "tak[e] into account all facts and circumstances relating to the economic arrangement of the partners." Id.
98. Id. The Service or the partnership may rebut this presumption by proving facts
which indicate "the partners' interests in the partnership are otherwise." In attempting to
rebut this presumption, the following facts and circumstances may be relevant:
(i) The partners' relative contributions to the partnership;
(ii) The interests of the partners in economic profits and losses (if different from that
in taxable income on loss);
(iii) The interests of the partners in cash flow and other distributions; and
(iv) The rights or the partners to distributions of capital and other property upon
liquidation.
Id. Cf. Rev. Proc. 74-17, 1974-1 C.B. 438, which requires that "[t]he interests of all of the
general partners, taken together, in each material item of partnership income, gain, loss,
deduction or credit [must] ... [be] at least one percent of each such item at all times during
the existence of the partnership." Id. at 1974-1 C.B. 439. Since the Proposed Regulations call
for the reallocation of invalidated special allocations in accordance with the partners' interests
in the partnership, this Revenue Procedure will seemingly be violated unless the general
partners are always allocated, as a group, at least one percent of each material item of
partnership income, gain, loss, deduction or credit.
99. Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(b)(3), 48 Fed. Reg. 9871 (1983). Cf. Unif. Partnership
Act § 18(a), 6 U.L.A. 213 (1969), which provides that, in the absence of a contrary provision
in the partnership agreement, the partners will "share equally in the profits . . . and must
contribute towards the losses" according to their ratios for sharing profits.
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The other opportunity for a partnership to satisfy section 704(b) is where
the special allocation "can be deemed to be in accordance with the partners'
interests in the partnership. ' 100 Such allocations involve deductions and
credits which do not produce a corresponding economic burden or benefit.
Such allocations can never have substantial economic effect because the partner
receiving the allocation does not acquire the economic benefit or bear the
economic burden resulting from the allocation2o1 The most important of
these deductions and credits are the investment tax credit, the percentage
depletion deduction, and deductions attributable to nonrecourse debt.
Investment tax credits 102 should be allocated "in accordance with the ratio
in which the partners divide the general profits of the partnership"''1° unless
"all related items of income, gain, loss, and deduction" attributable to the
property are specially allocated. 0 4 The partner to whom the related items of
income, gain, loss, and deduction are being specially allocated may be specially
allocated the investment tax credit if the former allocation has substantial
economic effect under section 704(b)(2).105 Such an allocation of investment
tax credit will be deemed to be in accordance with the partners' interests in the
partnership. 0 6 Percentage depletion deductions, 07 may be specially allocated
"if all items of income, gain, loss or deduction from the depletable property
are allocated" similarly, and such latter allocations "either have substantial
economic effect or are deemed to be in accordance with the partnership."10
Deductions or losses are attributable to nonrecourse debt to the extent the
principal balance of the nonrecourse debt exceeds the partnership's adjusted
basis in the property. This difference represents the "minimum taxable gain"
the partnership would be required to recognize in the event of a foreclosure
by the creditor. 0 9 The Proposed Regulations state that special allocations of
deductions or losses attributable to nonrecourse debt lack "substantial economic effect." 10 As previously noted, such an allocation lacks substantial
economic effect because the partner to whom the allocation is made does not

100.
101.

Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(b)(1)(i), 48 Fed. Reg. 9871 (1983).
Id. § 1.704-1(b)(2)(ii).

102. Id. § 1.704-1(b)(4)(ii).
103. Treas. Reg. § 1A-3(f)(2)(i), T.D. 6931, 1967-2 C.B. 12, 13.
104. Id. § IA6-3(f)(2)(ii), T.D. 6931, 1967-2 C.B. 12, 13.

105. Id.
106. Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(b)(4)(ii), 48 Fed. Reg. 9871 (1981).
107. Id. § 1.704-1(b)(4)(iii).
108. Id.
109. Id. § 1.704-1(b)(4)(iv). If the creditor is forced to foreclose on the property, the
partnership must include in its amount realized, as a minimum, the outstanding principal
balance of the nonrecourse debt. Crane v. Commissioner, 331 U.S. 1, 14 (1947). The outstanding principal balance of the nonrecourse debt will be included in the amount realized even
where the fair market value of the property has declined below the amount of the nonrecourse debt. Commissioner v. Tufts, 103 S. Ct. 1826 (1983). Therefore, the partnership will
always recognize a "minimum gain" upon foreclosure equal to the excess of the outstanding
principal balance of the nonrecourse debt over the partnership's adjusted basis in the
property. Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(b)(4)(iv), 48 Fed. Reg. 9871 (1983).
110. Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1,704-1(b)(4)(iii), 48 Fed. Reg. 9871 (1983).
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bear the economic burden associated with the deduction or loss."1 The economic burden is actually borne by the nonrecourse lender.11
Special allocations of deductions or losses attributable to nonrecourse debt
may nevertheless be recognized for tax purposes in three situations. First, such
allocations will be recognized if the partners adhere to the capital account requirements of the Proposed Regulations." 3 Second, such allocations will be
4
recognized if the capital account equivalence test is satisfied.1
5
The third situation" which will validate special allocations of deductions
or losses attributable to nonrecouse debt involves a complex set of requirements. Initially, such allocations must satisfy those capital account rules requiring the allocation to be properly reflected in the partners' capital accounts1 and the distribution of liquidation proceeds to be in accordance with
the partners' capital account balances."1 In addition, the special allocation
must "not cause the sum of the deficit capital account balances" of the
specially allocated partner or partners "to exceed the minimum gain."""
Finally, the paftnership agreement must provide that those "partners with
deficit capital account balances" resulting from such allocations shall be
allocated partnership income or gain "inan amount no less than the minimum
gain and at a time no later than the time at which the minimum gain is reduced below the sum of such deficit capital account balances."' 119 The application of these rules can be more clearly illustrated through an example.120
Assume A and B form the AB partnership to acquire and operate an
111.See supra notes 56-64 and accompanying text.

112.

Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(b)(4)(iv), 48 Fed. Reg. 9871 (1983).

113.

Id. The capital account requirements are as follows:

(a) The allocation is reflected as an appropriate increase or decrease in that partner's
capital account . .. [in accordance with tax accounting principles], and
(b) Liquidation proceeds are, throughout the term of the partnership, to be distributed
in accordance with the partners' capital account balances, and
(c) Any partner with a deficit in his capital account following the distribution of
liquidation proceeds is required to restore the amount of such deficit to the partnership, which amount shall be distributed to partners in accordance with their positive
capital account balances or paid to creditors.
Id. § L.704-1(b)(2)(ii).
114. Id. § 1.704-1(b)(4)(iv).
115. Id.
116. Id. § 1.704-1(b)(2)(ii)(a).
117. Id. § 1.704-1(b)(2)(ii)(b).
118. Id. § 1.704-1(b)(4)(iv)(a). The rationale for this requirement is to prevent the
partnership from specially allocating losses or deductions attributable to nonrecourse debt
to a partner with a negative capital account if another partner has a positive capital account. Bower & Larson, supra note 66, at 675. In such a situation, the Proposed Regulations
require the special allocation to have substantial economic effect. Prop. Treas. Reg.
§ 1.704-1(b)(5) ex. 17(i), 48 Fed. Reg. 9871 (1983). Unless the partner receiving the specially
allocated deduction or loss is also liable for the amount of his negative account upon
liquidation, the deduction or loss must be reallocated to those partners with positive capital
accounts. Id. § 1.704-1(b)(5) ex. 17(i) & (ii).
119. Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(b)(4)(iv)(b), 48 Fed. Reg. 9871 (1983).
120. See id. § 1.704-1(b)(5) ex. (17).
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apartment building, with each partner contributing $50,000 to the partnership. AB acquires an apartment building for $750,000, paying $100,000 cash
and executing a $650,000 nonrecourse note for the balance. No principal payments on the nonrecourse note are required for the first three years. The partnership agreement provides that all income, gain, loss, and deduction will be
allocated equally between A and B, with the exception of cost recovery deductions which will be allocated entirely to B. The agreement further states that
allocations will be reflected by appropriate adjustments to the partners' capital
accounts, and liquidation proceeds will be distributed throughout the term
of the partnership in accordance with capital account balances. Upon liquidation, however, neither partner is required to restore to the partnership the
deficit balance in his capital account for distribution to partners with positive
capital account balances.
In each of the first two years, the partnership has a $50,000 cost recovery
deduction, all of which is charged to B's capital account. The partnership has
no other taxable income or loss. At the end of the second year, the partnership's adjusted basis in the apartment building will be $650,000.123 Since the
principal balance of the nonrecourse note does not exceed the adjusted basis
of the building, neither the year 1 nor year 2 cost recovery deduction is attributable to nonrecourse debt. 122 Therefore, the substantial economic effect rules
28
of the Proposed Regulations will be applicable.1
The special allocation of the cost recovery deduction to B in year 1 has
substantial economic effect since his capital account suffered the entire economic burden associated with the deduction. The special allocation in year 2
does not have substantial economic effect since A is bearing the economic risk
of loss associated with the cost recovery deduction.124 Conversely, if the partnership agreement had provided that the partners would be liable for a
deficit in their capital accounts upon liquidation, B would bear the entire
economic risk of loss attributable to the cost recovery deduction.12 5 The special
allocation in year 2 would have a substantial economic effect in this situation.
In year 3, the partnership has no taxable income or loss except for another
$50,000 cost recovery deduction. The special allocation of this deduction to B
does not have substantial economic effect since the economic risk of loss attributable to the deduction is borne by the nonrecourse lender.26 The allocation of the year 3 cost recovery deduction to B can satisfy section 704(b)(2) if

121. The beginning basis of the building is its original cost of $750,000. I.R.C. § 1012
(1976). The principal balance of the nonrecourse note is included as part of the partnership's
cost of the property. Crane v. Commissioner, 331 U.S. 1, 11-12 (1947). The original cost of
$750,000 would be reduced by $100,000, the sum of the year 1 and year 2 allowable depreciation deductions, resulting in an adjusted basis of $650,000. I.R.C. § 1016(a)(2) (1976).
122. Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(b)(4)(iv), 48 Fed. Reg. 9871 (1983); see id. § 1.704-1(b)(5)

ex. (17)(i).
123. Id. § 1.704-1(b)(2)(ii) & (iii).
124. Id. § 1.704-1(b)(5) ex. (17)(i).
125. Id. § 1.704-1(b)(5) ex. (17)(ii). The result would be the same if an identical liability
was imposed under state law. Id.

126. Id. § 1.704-1(b)(5) ex. (17)(iii).
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it is made "in accordance with the partners' interests in the partnership."12
The partnership can provide for this in two ways. One is where B is legally
1 8
obligated to restore a deficit balance in his capital account upon liquidation. 2
The second is where the partnership agreement provides that B will be allocated partnership income and gain in an amount equal to his deficit capital
account. Such allocations will coincide, in amount and time, with any reduc129
tion of the principal balance of the nonrecourse note.
To illustrate the partnership income/gain chargeback provision, assume
the AB partnership agreement has a provision which will charge any future
partnership income or gains to B, to the extent the principal balance of the
nonrecourse note is reduced. The allocation of the cost recovery deduction to
B in the third year would then be in accordance with the partners' interests in
the partnership. 130 For example, in year 4, the partnership has an operating
profit of $200,000, excluding the cost recovery deduction of $50,000, and makes
a $100,000 payment on the nonrecourse note. After making the $100,000 payment, the partnership will have $100,000 of profit remaining, which will be
distributed $50,000 to A and $50,000 to B. These events would affect the
partners basis and capital accounts as follows:
A

B

Basis

Capital
Account

Basis

Capital
Account

$325,000

$0

$275,000

($ 50,000)

Balance-Beginning of
Year 4131
Operating Profit or Loss
Depreciation Deduction

50,000
-

50,000

150,000

150,000

-

(50,000)

(50,000)

Effect of Mortgage
Payment

(50,000)

-

(50,000)

Cash Distributions

(50,000)

(50,000)

(50,000)

Balance-End of Year 4

$275,000

$0

$275,000

-

(50,000)

$0

The effect of the income/gain chargeback provision is as follows. At the
end of year 4, prior to the mortgage payment, the principal balance of the
nonrecourse note is $650,000. The partnership's adjusted basis in the building,
after proper adjustment for the current year's cost recovery deduction, is

127. Id. § 1.704-1(b)(4)(iv).
128. Id.
129. Id. § 1.704-1(b)(4)(iv)(b).
130. Id. § 1.704-1(b)(5) ex. (17)(iv).
131. The partners' basis and capital accounts at the beginning of year 4 are based on the
assumption that the year 2 cost recovery deduction was reallocated to A. Each partner had a
beginning basis in his partnership interest of $375,000, consisting of the $50,000 cash contributed plus $325,000, which is one-half of the partnership's nonrecourse indebtedness.
I.R.C. §§ 722, 752(a) (1976). Since A received the $50,000 cost recovery deduction in year 2,
his basis would have been reduced to $325,000. B received both the year 1 and year 3 cost
recovery deductions, so his basis would have been reduced from $375,000 to $275,000.
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$550,000.132 Thus, prior to the mortgage payment the minimum gain which
would be recognized by AB if the nonrecourse lender was forced to foreclose
on the building is $100,000.s3 When the partnership makes the $100,000 payment on the nonrecourse note, the minimum gain is reduced from $100,000 to
zero.':3 The income/gain chargeback provision requires that B be allocated
partnership income and gain in an amount equal to his deficit account balance
to correspond with any reduction in the minimum gain. This allocation must
be made at the time of the mortgage payment.135 B is allocated the first
$100,000 of the partnership's operating profit which corresponds to the reduction of the minimum gain, and the balance is distributed $50,000 to A and
$50,000 to B.
An example will also illustrate the possible effect of the income/gain
chargeback provision should the nonrecourse lender be forced to foreclose.
Assume the partnership breaks even from an operating standpoint in year 5
and is unable to make the required mortgage payment. The nonrecourse
lender will be forced to foreclose at the beginning of year 6. Prior to the
foreclosure, the partners' basis and capital accounts would be as follows:
B

A
Basis

Capital
Account

Basis

Capital
Account

$275,000

$0

$275,000

$0

Operating Profit or Loss

-

-

-

-

Depreciation Deduction

-

-

Balance-End of Year 5

$275,000

$0

Balance-Beginning of
Year 5

(50,000)
$225,000

(50,000)
($50,000)

As a result of the foreclosure, the partnership would recognize a $50,000
taxable gain, the difference between the principal balance of the nonrecourse
note, $550,000, and the partnership's adjusted basis in the building, $500,000.
The income/gain chargeback provision requires that B be allocated the $50,000
gain since the principal balance of the nonrecourse note is being extinguished
by the transfer of the building to the foreclosing lender. 36 The gain will increase A's basis in his partnership interest to $275,000137 and will decrease the
deficit balance in his capital account to zero. Upon liquidation of the partnership, neither A nor B will realize any further tax consequences. 38 As for the
132. The building's adjusted basis is determined by taking its cost basis of $750,000 and
reducing it by $200,000, the sum of the cost recovery deductions for the four years. Id.

§ 1016(a)(2).
133. The "minimum gain" is the excess of the nonrecourse note's principal balance,
$650,000, over the partnership's adjusted basis in the building, $550,000. Prop. Treas. Keg.
11.704-1(b)(4)(iv), 48 Fed. Reg. 9871 (1983).
134. The principal balance of the nonrecourse mortgage, $550,000, will equal the property's adjusted basis, $550,000.
135. Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(b)(4)(iv)(b), 48 Fed. Reg. 9871 (1983).

186. Id.
187. I.R.C.§ 705(a)(1)(A) (1976).
138. Each partner is deemed to have received $275,000 of cash as a result of the decrease
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partnership, it suffered a $200,000 economic loss' 39 due to the foreclosure. This
economic loss was ultimately borne $50,000 by A and $150,000 by B.
ProposedRegulations' Effect on the
Real EstateLimited Partnership
The Proposed Regulations, if enacted in their present form, would have
three significant tax effects on the real estate limited partnership. On a positive
note, such partnerships would be able to provide for special allocations of deductions or losses attributable to nonrecourse debt to the limited partners
without requiring them to be liable for deficit balances in their capital accounts.'40 The other two tax effects, however, would have an adverse impact
on real estate limited partnerships. As previously noted, the substantiality requirement of the Proposed Regulations will invalidate any special allocation
that has merely a transitory economic effect. 141 Since real estate is likely to
appreciate in value, a special allocation of a deduction or loss attributable to
real estate, coupled with a gain chargeback provision, may have only a transi42
tory economic effect on the partner's share of partnership income or loss.1

in their share of the partnership's liabilities. Id. § 752(b). However, each partner has an
adjusted basis of $275,000 in his partnership interest so there will be no gain or loss realized
by them upon liquidation of the partnership. Id. § 1001(a).
It should be noted that as of the date this article was published, the Treasury Department has announced that the Proposed Regulations under Section 704(b), insofar as they
relate to deductions attributable to recourse indebtedness or capital contributions by the
partners, will be adopted as final regulations in the next few months. However, the Treasury
Department has also announced that it intends to modify the Proposed Regulations, to the
extent that they deal with deductions attributable to nonrecourse liabilities, before issuing
such rules as final regulations.
As previously discussed, the Proposed Regulations state that the allocation of a deduction
or loss attributable to a nonrecourse indebtedness of a partnership can never possess "substantial economic effect" since the economic burden of the loss is on the lender. A strict
interpretation of section 704(b) literally requires that all allocations that lack "substantial
economic effect" must be reallocated among the partners in accordance with their interests
in the partnership based on all of the facts and circumstances. The Treasury Department
has apparently decided to abandon the "minimum gain" chargeback and the capital accounts analysis concepts promulgated under the Proposed Regulations, as currently drafted,
which would deem such allocations to be in accordance with the partners' interests in the
partnership, in favor of a strict interpretation of section 704(b) which would prohibit the
special allocation of any deductions or losses attributable to a partnership's nonrecourse
indebtedness. Under the Treasury Department's new approach, all deductions attributable
to the partnership's nonrecourse indebtedness would have to be allocated among the partners in accordance with their relative interests in the partnership. The Treasury Department
intends to provide more definitive and objective rules governing the determination of the
partners' interest in the partnership. Apparently, the most important factor to be considered
in determining the partners' interests will be the partners' relative capital contributions to
the partnership.
139. The partnership purchased the building for $750,000 and realized $550,000, the
unpaid principal balance of the nonrecourse mortgage, upon foreclosure.
140. Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(b)(4)(iv), 48 Fed. Reg. 9871 (1983).
141. Id. § 1.704-1(b)(2)(iii)(a).
142. See supra notes 84-87 and accompanying text.
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The application of the substantiality requirement, therefore, may limit the
143
use of gain chargeback provisions in some real estate partnerships.
A second adverse effect stems from the Proposed Regulations' selection of
personal liability as the sole criterion for determining which partners bear the
economic burden associated with deductions or losses attributable to partnership indebtedness.144 A limited partner will not be permitted to receive allocations of losses or deductions attributable to the partnership's recourse in145
debtedness which exceed the partner's capital contributions.
A strict application of this rule to the typical real estate limited partnership may cause some inappropriate tax results. 146 For example, assume A, the
general partner, and B, the limited partner, form the AB limited partnership
to construct and operate an office building. A contributes $1,000 to the partnership and agrees to procure financing for the construction of the building.
A further agrees to serve as office building manager in exchange for a ten
percent interest in the partnership. B contributes $1,000,000 to the partnership
in exchange for a 90 percent interest in the partnership. The partnership
agreement provides that the profits, losses and cash flow from the partnership
operations will be shared in accordance with the partners' respective percentage interests in the partnership; however, the first $1,000,000 of tax losses
are to be specially allocated to the limited partner B. If the building is later
sold, any profit or loss will be allocated in accordance with the partners' percentage interests, subject to a gain chargeback to B of the $1,000,000 specially
allocated tax losses. The agreement further provides that the allocation of the
$1,000,000 of tax losses to B is to be properly reflected in his capital account
in accordance with tax accounting principles. Upon liquidation, proceeds are
to be distributed in accordance with the partners' capital account balances.
In addition, neither partner will be required to restore a deficit balance in his
capital account.
In year 1, A arranges a loan commitment for $10,000,000 to finance construction of the building on a temporary recourse basis. A also receives a commitment from a permanent lender to provide permanent nonrecourse financing
to pay off the construction loan. This nonrecourse financing will be available
once the office building is 75 percent occupied by tenants. The partnership
receives $5,000,000 of the construction loan commitment in year 1 and begins
construction on the building, incurring $750,000 of construction period interest
for the first year.147 In year 2, the partnership receives the balance of the construction loan, $5,000,000, and incurs construction period interest totaling

143. See Bower & Larson, supra note 66, at 673-74.
144. Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(b)(5) ex. (15), 48 Fed. Reg. 9871 (1983).
145. Id. Capital contributions include those that a limited partner has made or is legally

obligated to make in the future.
146. The following argument relies primarily on two comments made by Arthur Andersen & Co. concerning the Proposed Regulations. For the full text of these comments, see
Gotliboski, TAX Nors (May 2, 1983) at Microfiche Data Base Doc. 83-3897; Faggen, TAX
NomEs (May 2, 1983) at Microfiche Data Base Doc. 83-3899.
147. This assumes the construction loan calls for an annual interest rate of 15% on the
unpaid principal balance of $5,000,000.
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$1,500,000.145 In year 3, the partnership completes construction and achieves
a 60 percent occupancy. For year 3, the partnership suffers a tax loss of
$1,700,000, consisting of the following items:
Operating Profit or (Loss)
1
Depreciation Deduction

($975,000)

49

(500,000)

Amortization of Construction Period Interest'"

(225,000)

Partnership Taxable Income (Loss)

($1,700,000)

At the end of year 3, the respective basis and capital accounts of A and B
would be as follows:

Basis
Capital Contribution
Effect of Partnership
Liabilitiesisi

Capital
Account
$1,000

$1,000

Capital
Account

$1,000,000

$1,000,000

10,000,000

Year 1-Partnership
Taxable2 Income
(Loss)

Basis

15

Year 2-Partnership
Taxable3 Income
15

(Loss)

(75,000)

(75,000)

(225,000)

(225,000)

Year 3-Partnership
Taxable Income
(Loss)" 4

Balance-End of
Year 3

(100,000)

(100,000)

(1,600,000)

(1,600,000)

$9,901,000

($ 99,000)

($ 900,000)

($ 900,000)

Under the Proposed Regulations, the year 3 allocation of $1,600,000 of
partnership taxable loss to partner B does not have substantial economic effect
148.

In year 2, the unpaid principal balance of the construction loan would be

.$10,000,000. With an interest rate of 15%, the interest charge would be $1,500,000.
149. The depreciation deduction is based on the assumption that the partnership has a
cost basis of $7,500,000 in the building and has chosen to depreciate it over 15 years under
the straight line method. I.R.C. § 168(b)(3) (Supp. V 1981).
150. The partnership incurred a total of $2,250,000 of construction period interest, which
would be amortized at the rate of 10%. I.R.C. § 189(b) (West 1983).
151. Since the construction loan is recourse, A, the general partner, would be allocated
all of the tax basis attributable to the partnership's indebtedness. I.R.C. §§ 752(a), 722
(1976); Treas. Reg. § 1.752-1(e) (1956).
152. The partnership's tax loss for year I would consist of the amortization of the construction period interest, $750,000, at the rate of 10%. I.R.C. § 189(b) (Supp. V 1981).
153. The partnership's tax loss for year 2 would consist of the amortization of the construction period interest for the first two years, $2,250,000, at the rate of 10%. Id.
154. Pursuant to the partnership agreement, B must receive the first $700,000 of the tax
losses for year 3 and the balance, $1,000,000, must be allocated 10% to A and 90% to B.
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55
since he is not liable for the deficit balance in his capital account. According to the Proposed Regulations, the loss must be reallocated between the
partners in accordance with their interests in the partnership. 156 Since partner
A is personally liable for the construction loan and thus bears the economic
risk of loss attributable to such loan, he must be reallocated $900,000 of the
$1,600,000 loss.' 5 7 After reallocating the year 3 loss, the partners' basis and
capital accounts would be as follows:

Basis

Capital
Account
$1,000

$1,000

Capital Contribution
Effect of Partnership
Liabilities

Basis

Capital
Account

$1,000,000

$1,000,000

10,000,000

Year 1-Partnership
Taxable Income
(Loss)

(75,000)

(75,000)

Year 2-Partnership
Taxable Income
(Loss)

(225,000)

(225,000)

(700,000)

(700,000)

Year 3-Partnership
Taxable Income
(Loss)

(1,000,000)

Balance-End of
Year 3

$9,001,000

(1,000,000)
($ 999,000)

$0

$0

In year 4, the partnership leases the remaining office space in the building
and receives the $10,000,000 nonrecourse permanent loan. The partnership
thereafter pays off the $10,000,000 temporary recourse construction loan. The
partnership breaks even in year 4 from a tax standpoint, determined as follows:
Operating Profit or (Loss)

$725,000

Depreciation Deduction

(500,000)

Amortization of Construction Period Interest

(225,000)
$0

Partnership Taxable Income (Loss)

The partnership operations for year 4 would affect the partners' basis and
capital accounts as follows:

Balance-Beginning
of Year 4
155.
156.
157.

Basis

Capital
Account

$9,001,000

($999,000)

Basis

Capital
Account

Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(b)(2)(ii)(c), 48 Fed. Reg. 9871 (1983).
Id. § 1.704-1(b)(1)(i).
Id. § 1.704-1(b)(5) ex. (15).

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1983

31

Florida Law Review, Vol. 35, Iss. 5 [1983], Art. 3
UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. XXXV

Year 4-Partnership
Taxable Income
(Loss)
Effect of Partnership
Liabilities

(9,000,000)

Balance-End of
Year 4

$

1,000

-

($999,000)

9,000,000
$9,000,000

-

$0

Because the partnership indebtedness was converted from recourse to nonrecourse during the year, A is deemed to have received a $9,000,000 cash distribution from the partnership and B is deemed to have made a $9,000,000 contribution of cash to the partnership. 58
The reallocation of $900,000 of the year 3 loss to partner A, as required by
the Proposed Regulations, does not truly reflect the economics of the real
estate limited partnership. The fact that partner A is personally liable for the
partnership's indebtedness at the end of year 3 does not mean he will actually
bear the economic burden or cost associated with this $900,000 of tax losses.
Partner A will bear the economic risk of loss attributable to these deductions
only if the real estate venture is unsuccessful and the principal balance of the
partnership's recourse indebtedness exceeds the fair market value of the office
building at the end of year 3.155 If the real estate venture is successful, the
construction loan will be satisfied with the proceeds of the permanent nonrecourse loan. The nonrecourse loan then will be paid with the partnership
income generated by the office building. The taxable income resulting from
the partnership's operations will be allocated ninety percent to B and ten
percent to A. In the end, B is required to report taxable income used by the
partnership to pay off the indebtedness that produced the $900,000 of tax losses
reallocated to A. 160
To avoid this unintended economic effect, the Proposed Regulations should
be modified to require a consideration of the fair market value of the partnership assets when determining if an allocation is in accordance with the partners' interests in the partnership. 161 If the fair market value of the partnership
assets exceeds the principal balance of the partnership's recourse indebtedness,
then tax losses attributable to such indebtedness should not be reallocated to
general partners solely because they are personally liable for the indebtedness. 162 Such a reallocation clearly conflicts with economic reality where the
fair market value of the partnership assets are sufficient to satisfy the partnership indebtedness.
An additional argument against reallocation of these losses to the general
partner is found in section 704(d). 163 This subsection states that a partner may
158. I.R.C. § 752(a), (b) (1976); Treas. Reg. § 1.752-1(e) (1956). Since A is deemed to
have received $9,000,000 in money, his adjusted basis in his partnership interest is reduced
to $1,000. I.R.C. § 733(l) (1976).
159. See Faggen, supra note 146, at 1; Gotliboski, supra note 143, at 6.
160. See Faggen, supra note 146, at 10.
161. Id. at 12.
162. Id. at 11-12.
163. I.R.C. § 704(d) (Supp. V 1980).
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not deduct tax losses from the partnership in excess of his adjusted basis in
his partnership interest.1'1 These losses are not disallowed permanently, but
are merely suspensed until the partner's adjusted basis in his partnership interest is increased by an amount sufficient to absorb the losses.16 5 When section
704(d) is applied to the year 3 allocation of the tax losses, B would only be
allowed to deduct $700,000 of the $1,600,000 of losses. The other $900,000 of
tax losses would be suspensed until B's adjusted basis in his partnership interest
was increased. In year 4, when the recourse indebtedness is replaced by nonrecourse indebtedness, B's adjusted basis in his partnership interest would increase by $9,000,000.166 B could then deduct the $900,000 of suspensed tax losses
in year 4.
Section 704(d), in effect, disallows a partner a current deduction for his
share of the partnership tax losses unless he has a sufficient economic investment in the partnership to absorb the losses.. 6 7 The same is true even where a
partner's adjusted basis in his partnership interest includes his share of the
partnership's nonrecourse indebtedness. The latter results because a partner
is not permitted to increase his adjusted basis for his share of the partnership's
nonrecourse debt unless the property securing the debt has a fair market value
68
at least equal to the amount of such indebtedness.
CONCLUSION

The Proposed Regulations, as a whole, reflect a gallant effort by the Department of the Treasury to properly interpret section 704(b). Some modifications, however, should be made before their final issuance. First, the Proposed
Regulations' retroactive application of the "fundamental principles" to taxable years beginning after December 31, 1975 should be changed. This retroactive application would inflict an undue hardship on partnerships that have
not been maintaining their partners' capital accounts in accordance with tax
accounting principles. Instead, partnership special allocations for prior years
should be subject to the rules contained in existing case law, committee reports, current Treasury Regulations and Revenue Rulings. 69
Secondly, losses attributable to the partnership's recourse indebtedness that
are specially allocated to limited partners in excess of their capital contributions should not automatically be reallocated to the general partners. In this
regard, the Proposed Regulations should be modified to require an examination of the economic reality surrounding the special allocation. If the fair
market value of the partnership assets exceeds the principal amount of the
recourse indebtedness, the special allocation to the limited partners should be
allowed. Section 704(d) will suspend this special allocation of losses until the
limited partners increase their investment in the partnership.17o
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. I.R.C. § 752(a) (1976); Treas. Reg. § 1.752-1(e) (1956).
167. See Faggen supra note 146, at 12; Gotliboski, supra note 147, at 7-8.
168. Rev. Rul. 77-110, 1977-1 C.B. 58, 59; Estate of Franklin v. Commissioner, 64 T.C.
752 (1975), aff'd, 544 F.2d 1045 (9th Cir. 1976).
169. See supra note 15.

170.

See supra notes 144-168 and accompanying text.
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Finally, the Proposed Regulations' elevation of "substantiality" as a
separate and coequal test with "economic effect" should be changed. This
standard is too subjective and will enable the Internal Revenue Service to
disallow special allocations tfhat actually have a significant economic effect on
the partners' shares of the partnership income or loss.
A.
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